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I would like to propose in this article that the question of the Sacred is 
by no means closed in Schopenhauer's philosophy. A careful analysis of his 
Weltanschauung and anthropological claims illustrates that a "back door" to 
this question is left ajar for the student of Schopenhauer's thought. Raising 
the question about a so-called "back door" to the Sacred in his philosophy, of 
course, brings into focus whether a "front door" approach to the 
aforementioned issue has any relevance. One would justifiably presume 
that the question of a "back door" to the problematic at hand would not even 
be raised if it could be clearly ascertained that a direct approach to the Holy 
were a possibility for Schopenhauer. But were this truly to be the case, the 
entire tenor of his philosophy would change. For a "front door" to the 
Sacred, from a philosophical point of view, means that it is possible to speak 
meaningfully about God. Schopenhauer, however, maintains that any 
philosophical discourse about a personal, creator God is beyond the 
exigence of reason in light of his acceptance of the Kantian critique which 
discredits the ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological proofs for 
God's existence.' 
An indication of what exactly is meant by the word God in 
Schopenhauer's Weltanschauung is given in Über die vierfache Wurzel des 
Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde (On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason) where the following is stated: "The word God, honestly 
used, denotes such a cause of the world with the addition of personality." 2 
Another passage from the same work is even more specific in that the above 
notion is expanded. Here Schopenhauer contends that 'the doctrine of God' 
entails that the Supreme Being be understood as "creator and ruler of the 
world, a personal and therefore an individual being endowed with 
understanding and will, who has brought it forth out of nothing and guides 
• Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung 1, "Kritik des 
Kantischen Philosophie," Zürcher Ausgabe in zehn Bänden, Band 11, S.623-624. 
Henceforth cited as Vorstellung. English translation: The World as Will and 
Representation, "Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy," vol. 1, trans. E. F. J. 
Payne (New York: Dover, 1969), p. 511. Henceforth cited as Representation. 
2 Arthur Schopenhauer, Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden 
Grunde, in Zürcher Ausgabe in zehn Bänden, Band V (Zürich: Diogenes Verlag, 
1977), 8, S.25. Henceforth cited as Grunde. English translation: Arthur 
Schopenhauer, The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, trans. E. F. 
J. Payne (La Salle: Open Court, 1974), § 8, p. 18. Henceforth cited as Reason. 
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it with highest wisdom, power and goodness." 3 In Parerga und Paralipomena 
the same claims are once again clearly underscored. Schopenhauer states 
that theism "demands a world-cause that is not only different from the 
world, but is intelligent, that is to say, knows and wills, and so is personal 
and consequently individual; it is only such a cause that is indicated by the 
word God." 4 
From a strictly philosophical point of view that prescinds from the data 
of revelation, Schopenhauer argues that the existence of a personal God with 
the above attributes cannot be proven from experience. Thus, he is not in 
agreement with supporters of the ontological proof for the existence of God, 
who contend that the notion of existence is already contained in the concept 
of a supremely perfect being. 5 Calling the proof a "delightful farce," 
Schopenhauer maintains that the attributes the proof ascribes to God are in 
no way grounded in empirical reality and that, in effect, the ontological 
proof is but a 'phantom' in one's brain. 6 
With regard to the cosmological proof, Schopenhauer admits at the outset 
that if the exigence of reason could "attain to the concept of God, even 
without revelation, this obviously happens only under the guidance of 
causality."^ But given his analysis of causality as pertaining only to an 
endless series of changes in states of matter, "a First Cause is as unthinkable 
as a beginning of time or a limit for space." 8 This means in effect, therefore, 
that there is but one correct formulation for the law of causality in 
Schopenhauer's Weltanschauung; "every change has its cause in another change 
immediately preceding it."9 Schopenhauer states: "...show me an unmoved 
cause; it is simply impossible." 1 0 The law of causality, in short, is immanent 
to the world and can have no transcendent application. It applies to things 
3 Ibid., § 34, S.140; Ibid., § 34, p.182. 
4 Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga und Paralipomena I, in Zürcher Ausgabe Werke 
in zehn Bänden, Band VII (Zürich: Diogenes Verlag, 1977), § 13, S.131. 
Henceforth cited as Parerga I. English translation: Parerga and Paralipomena, 
trans, by E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), vol. 1, § 13, p. 115. 
Henceforth cited as Parerga. 
5 Cf. Grunde, V, § 7, S.22-24; Reason, § 7, p. 14-16 for a detailed critique of the 
ontological proof as outlined by Descartes, for example. 
6/to</.,S.23-24; Ibid., p. 15. 
7 Vorstellung l, "Kritik des Kantischen Philosophie," II, S.621; Representation, I, 
"Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy," p. 509. 
8 Arthur Schopenhauer, Über die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens, in ZStrcher 
Ausgabe Werke in zehn Bänden, Band VI, 111, S.66. Henceforth cited as Freiheit. 
English translation: Essay on the Freedom of the Will, trans. Konstantin 
Kolenda (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), III, p. 28. Henceforth cited as 
Freedom. 
y Vorstellung II, III, Kap.4, S.54; Representation, II, ch. 4, p. 42. 
10/!>«/.; Ibid. 
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in the world, but not to the world itself. 1 1 Hence, discourse about a First 
Cause is meaningless in this respect as the following passage from Über die 
vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde indicates: 
The law of causality is . . . not so obliging as to allow itself 
to be used like a cab which we dismiss after we arrive at 
our destination. On the contrary, it is like the broom that 
is brought to life by Goethe's apprentice magician which, 
once set in motion, neither stops running nor fetching 
water, so that only the old wizard himself can bring it to 
rest. 1 2 
As far as the physico-theologica! argument is concerned, Schopenhauer 
in Über die vierfache Wurzel des Salzes vom zureichenden Grunde admits that it 
"has much more plausibility (viel mehr Scheinbarkeit)." M Teleological factors 
in the cosmos seemingly suggest that the universe in some way or another is 
the product of a mind other than our own. Thus, he states in Über den Willen 
in der Natur (On the Will in Nature): 
The evident suitability of each animal to its manner of life 
and outward means of subsistence, even down to the 
smallest detail, and the exceeding perfection of its 
organization, is the richest material of teleological 
contemplation to which the human mind from time 
immemorial has readily applied itself . . . The universal 
fitness for their ends, the obvious intentionality in all parts 
of the animal organism clearly announce that here forces 
of nature are not working accidentally and without a plan, 
but rather that a will has been act ive . 1 4 
As the above indicates, the physico-theological proof for God's existence 
is grounded on the apparent finality in the cosmos as especially evidenced in 
animal organisms. This would imply that the world in some way or another 
is the product of an intellect or mind. Schopenhauer, however, rejects this 
possibility at the very outset. He states succinctly 
'i Hi«/.,S.56; Ibid., p. 43. 
>2 Grunde, V, § 20, S.133; Reason, § 20, pp. 58-59. 
•3 Grunde, V, § 20, S.56; Reasim, § 20, p. 62. 
N Arthur Schopenhauer, Über den Willen in der Natur, in Zürcher Ausgabe 
Werke in zehn Bänden (Zürich: Diogenes, 1977), Band V, S.235. Henceforth 
cited as Natur. English translation: On the Will in Nature, trans. Mme. K. 
Hillebrand (London: George Bell & Sons, 1889), p. 255. Henceforth cited as 
Nature. 
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The world is not made with the help of knowledge and 
therefore not from without, but from within . . . The 
physico-theological ider that an intellect must have 
ordered and modeled nature, which is suitable to the 
unrefined mind, is superficial and nevertheless 
fundamentally wrong. 1 5 
Schopenhauer goes on to argue that the intellect, as secondary, can 
never have been the condition for the world's existence since it is a 
subordinate principle to the noumenal will, and consequently of a latter 
origin. He maintains the following: 
. . . the intellect is recognized by us solely from animal 
nature and consequently as an absolutely secondary and 
subordinate principle in the world, a product of the latest 
origin. It can never, for this reason, have been the 
condition for the existence of that world. Nor can a 
mundus intelligibilis precede a mundus sensibilis; since it 
receives its material from the latter alone. It is not an 
intellect that has brought forth nature; it is, rather, nature 
which has brought forth the intellect. 1 6 
Given the above claims, teleological facticity is ascribed to the will as 
principle of being—not to God. As a case in point, aseity is categorically 
ascribed to the noumenal will. 'That which the scholastics called the aseity of 
God is fundamentally what I attribute to the will and have called its 
groundlessness." 1 7 So as to remove any doubt whatsoever as to what he 
means, the following claim is made: "My teaching explains the existence of 
the world (which they maintain to be a work of God) from the omnipotence 
(Allmacht) of the W/Ü."1 8 Accordingly, whatever finality the beholder sees in 
the cosmos is ultimately explicable by the noumenal will. The following 
passage speaks for itself: 
. . . the will, as that which fills everything and manifests 
itself immediately in each, thus characterizing everything 
as its phenomenon, appears everywhere as that which is 
primary. It is just for this reason, that all teleological facts 
1 5 Ibid., S.237; Ibid., pp. 257-258. 
1 6 Ibid., S.237-238; Ibid., p. 258. 
1 7 Arthur Schopenhauer, Der handschriftliche Nachlaß, herausgegeben von 
Arthur Hubscher (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985), Band 
1V.I, S.102. Henceforth cited as Nachlaß. English translation: Manuscript 
Remains, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Berg, 1988), vol. 4, p. 124. 
1 8 Ibid., S.170; Ibid., p. 196. 
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are to be explained from the will of the being itself in 
which they are observed. 1 9 
Notwithstanding the veneer of the teleological facticity of nature, 
Schopenhauer denies that works produced by animal instinct, such as the 
spider's web, the bee's honeycomb and its cells, the white ant's constructions, 
and so forth, are the result of "a concept of purpose, of a far-reaching 
providence, and of rational deliberation." They are, rather, "evidently the 
work of a blind impulse, i.e., of a will which is not guided by knowledge." 2 0 
Moreover, beneath the veneer of the teleological facticity of nature, 
there lies the will's diseased essence which alone explains reality's 
scarredness. 2 1 Schopenhauer is not swayed by the call to behold the world's 
external beauty given the reality of pain and suffering. He states 
categorically: "But is the world then a peep show (Guckkasten)? These things 
are beautiful to behold, but to be them is something altogether different." 2 2 In 
short, the suffering and pain that come to the foreground with the 
appearance of sensibility and intelligence in the animal and human sphere of 
phenomenal being prohibit the honest person from "breakjing] out into 
hallelujahs." 2 5 It goes without saying, therefore, that the physico-theological 
argument is not acceptable for Schopenhauer. 
In light of the above, there is no God in Schopenhauer's world as will 
and representation. Accordingly, reality does not serve as a bridge that 
leads to a Transcendent and Supreme Being. This notwithstanding, three 
passages from the corpus of his thought imply, at the very least, that God's 
existence does not hinge upon the aforementioned proofs. As a case in 
point, the claim is made in Über die vierfache Wurzel des Salzes vom 
zureichenden Grunde that the impossibility to prove the existence of God does 
not call into question that existence, inasmuch as it stands on the firmer 
ground of revelation. 2 4 So as to remove any doubt about what he means, 
Schopenhauer repeats himself later in the same section (* 35) of the 
aforementioned work: ". . . the existence of God is a matter of revelation 
(Sache der Offenbarung) and is unshakably established thereby." 2 5 Another 
passage from Parerga und Paralipomena highlights once again the futility of 
attempting to prove God's existence otherwise than from the scriptures. 
w Natur, V, S.238; Nature, p. 258. 
2<> Ibid.; Ibid. 
2* Vorstellung It. IV, Kap.46, S.678. ". . . nur ein blinder, kein sehender Wille 
konnte sich selbst in die Lage versetzen, in der wir uns erblicken."; 
Representation, II, ch. 46, p. 579. 
2 2 Ibid.. S.680; Ibid., p.5S\. 
23/<>/</., S. 681; Ibid. 
2 4 Grunde, V, § 34, S.141; Reason, § 34, p. 183. 
25/Wrf.,S.145; Ibid., p. 188. 
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In the Christian religion the existence of God is an 
established fact and beyond all investigation. This is as it 
should be; for it belongs here and is itself established by 
revelation. I therefore regard it as a mistake of the 
rationalists, when they attempt in their dogmas to prove 
the existence of God otherwise than from the Scriptures. 2 6 
But this interesting claim is weakened by his insistence that revelation is 
nothing more than the thoughts of sages who, as human beings, are subject 
to error . 2 7 Given this unfortunate demythologization of revelation, it is 
difficult to see how Schopenhauer can still maintain that God's existence 
rests on unshakable ground. For in a Feuerbachian sense theism and its 
claims spring solely from the agitated heart of the human person and have 
no rational foundation. 2 8 God is nothing but a fabrication hypostatized by 
"the intense desire of tormented man." 2 9 Schopenhauer in effect states that 
prayer to a divine being is at bottom a form of idolatry. 
Whether we make an idol out of wood, stone, or metal, or 
construct it from abstract concepts, it is all the same. It 
remains idolatry, as soon we have before us a personal 
being to whom we offer sacrifices and whom we invoke 
and thank. At bottom it is not so different whether we 
offer our sheep, or our inclinations. Each rite or prayer 
undeniably is evidence of idolatry.*0 
The above notwithstanding, Schopenhauer underscores that it is part 
and parcel of the nature of the "animal metaphysicum" to seek for meaning. 
As such, the German pessimist juxtaposes two systems of metaphysics, one 
reserved for philosophers, the other, religion, constituting a "metaphysics of 
the people" (Volksmetaphysik).31 Unlike philosophy which deals with pristine 
truth, religion can, at best, express truth sensu allegorico.*2 Schopenhauer, 
however, demythologizes religion to such an extent that, while being 
expressive of the metaphysical need for meaning, it no longer is an 
encounter with the Holy. 3 3 Introspection does not usher one into the very 
threshold to the Holy. On the contrary! It is the diseased will, as known via 
2 6 Parerga I, VII, § 13, S.121; Parerga, 1, § 13, pp. 105-106. 
2 7 Parerga II, X, § 176, S.399; Parerga, II, § 176, p. 361. 
2 8 Parerga I, VII, § 13, S.133-134; Parerga, I, § 13, p. 117. 
2 9 Ibid., S.134; Ibid., pp. 117-118. 
30 Parerga II, X, § 178, S.416-417; Parerga, II, § 178, pp. 377-378. 
3' Vorstellung II, 111, Kap.17, S.191 -192; Representation, II, ch.17, pp. 164-165. 
3 2 / M . , S . 1 9 4 ; Ibid. 
3 3 Cf. Jörg Salaquarda, "Schopenhauer und die Religion," Schopenhauer-
lahrbuch, 69 (1989), S.324-325. 
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the path of introspection, that properly speaking is the wis rcalissimuni. As he 
states in Über den Willen in der Natur: 
If I therefore say 'will, will-to-live' this is no ens rationis, no 
hypostasis created by me, nor is it a word of uncertain, 
vague meaning; on the contrary, I refer him who asks me 
what it may be, to his own inner self, where he will find it 
entire, indeed, in colossal dimension, as a true ens 
realissiinutn M 
Schopenhauer contends, moreover, that there is no power that can 
straighten the crooked wood that the human person is. The will-filled 
condition of the human being, in a word, is hopeless given the inalterability 
of the character. As is stated in Über der Grundlage der Moral (On the Basis of 
Morality), the wicked are as little able to change their character as the serpent 
is able to rid itself of its fangs. 3 5 Accordingly, it is sheer folly for the tortured 
person (der Gequälte) to expect Heaven to provide an answer to the enigmas 
of life. As is stated in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (The World as Will and 
Representation), "an external power can little change or suppress this will, 
and any strange power is just as little able to free it from the miseries which 
result from the life that is the phenomenon of that wil l . " 3 6 In this respect, it 
is understandable why Schopenhauer maintains that a resounding silence is 
the only greeting that frightened human beings can hope to expect as an 
answer to the troublesome riddle of existence. 
The ephemeral generations of human beings arise and 
pass away in quick succession, while the individuals with 
anxiety, want, and pain, dance into the arms of death. 
They thereby unremittingly ask what is the matter with 
them and what meaning the whole tragi-comic farce has. 
They cry to heaven for an answer. But heaven remains 
silent. 3 7 
3 4 Natur, V, S.340; Nature, p. 376. 
3 5 Arthur Schopenhauer, Über der Grundlage der Moral, in Zürcher Ausgabe 
Werke in zehn Bänden (Zürich: Diogenes Verlag, 1977), Band VI, § 20, S.290. 
Henceforth cited as Grundlage. English translation: On the Basis of Morality, 
trans. E. F. j . Payne (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), § 20, p. 187.. 
Henceforth cited as Basis. The German passage reads as follows: 
. . . der Unterschied der Charaktere is angeboren und unvertilgbar. 
Dem Boshaften ist seine Bosheit so angeboren, wie der Schlange ihre 
Giftzahne und Giftblase; und so wenig wie sie kann er es andern. 
3 6 Vorstellung l, II, § 59, S.407; Representation, I, § 59, pp. 325-326. 
3 7 Parerga II, X, 176, S.378; Parerga, II, § 176, p. 361. 
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As the above indicates, the chief stumbling block for the reasonableness 
of belief in God is the stubborn and continued existence of evil in reality, but 
particularly in the agitated heart of the human being. For Schopenhauer the 
ultimate reason for this, of course, is the very essence or nature of the 
noumenal will which strives aimlessly without ultimate satisfaction. The 
following claim is made in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung: 
Willing and striving is the will's whole essence, [which can 
be] fully compared to an unquenchable thirst. The basis of 
all willing is need (Bedürftigkeit), lack (Mangel), therefore 
pain (Schmerz), which is already original to it and falls to it 
(anheimfällt) by its nature. 3 8 
It makes little sense to speak about a Summum Bonum in this respect. For 
"good" is a relative concept related only to the desiring will. A Summun 
Bonum, whatever that might be, would be that which ultimately halts the 
frustrated striving of the will. Given Schopenhauer's presuppositions, such 
a reality is an impossibility, as the following passage indicates: 
. . . every good is essentially relative, for it has its essence 
only in relation to a desiring will. Accordingly, absolute 
good is a contradiction; highest good, Summum Bonum, 
signifies the same thing, that is, in reality a final 
satisfaction of the will, after which no fresh willing would 
take place; a last motive, the attainment of which would 
yield an imperishable satisfaction of the will. According 
to our .discussion up to now . . ., such a thing is 
unthinkable. The will can just as little through some 
satisfaction cease to will always again and anew, as time 
can end or begin; for the will there is no lasting fulfillment 
which completely and forever satisfies its striving. 3 9 
The above notwithstanding, even if one is taken in by the "the size, the 
order, and the completeness of the world," nevertheless it is indeed valid to 
imagine that "what had the power to produce such a world must also have 
been able to avoid the evil and wickedness." 4 0 In a word, it makes no sense 
for such a power to be impotent before the reality of ontological, physical, 
and moral evil in what supposedly is His creation. As early as 1807 there is 
evidence that Schopenhauer's young mind, still very much in formation, was 
struggling with the mystery of evil in reality. In an early fragment dating 
from that year we see him even postulating a dualism between two wills. 
Two alternatives are proposed: If there were a Good Will in reality, there 
3 8 Vorstellung I, II, § 57, S.390; Representation, I, § 57, p. 312. 
3 9 Ibid., II, § 65, S.450; Ibid., I, § 65, p. 362. 
4 0 Vorstellung 11, 111, Kap. 17, S.201; Representation, II, p. 172. 
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then exists alongside it an evil power that throws it off-stride and compels it 
into detours. The other alternative is just as unattractive. For the dark side 
of reality is then ascribed to chance, which thereby entails that the guiding 
will is flawed. 4 1 
Subsequently, with the passage of the years, Schopenhauer rejected the 
aforementioned postulate. With the maturing of his philosophy, he 
contended that belief in a personal Creator God is unacceptable because it 
compromises moral responsibility for one's actions. He states in Parerga und 
Paralipomena:". . . theism and man's moral responsibility are irreconcilable 
because the responsibility quite certainly falls back upon the creator of the 
nature where it has its center of gravi ty . " 4 2 The doctrine of moral 
responsibility for actions is salvageable only to the extent that human nature 
is its "own work"--and not that of another. The following passage from Die 
Well ab Wille und Vorstellung makes this clear: 
My philosophy . . . is the only one that grants to morality 
its complete and entire rights; for only if the essence of 
man is his own will, consequently only if he is in the 
strictest sense, his own work, are his deeds actually 
completely his and attributable to him. On the other hand, 
as soon as he has another origin, or is the work of a being 
different from himself, all his guilt falls back on to this 
origin or originator. For operari sequitur esse.43 
What all this suggests is that Schopenhauer's thought is atheistic in its 
main thrust. Moreover, it is evident that Schopenhauer had by his late teens 
forsaken belief in a personal God as his Nachlaß and Gespräche indicate. A 
good illustration was already cited above in an entry from Nachlaß dating 
from 1807 (cf. endnote 41). Inasmuch as the young Schopenhauer situates 
God in a struggle against evil or chance, Safranski aptly describes it as a 
"dethronement of God by a dualistic construction." 4 4 In another passage 
from Nachlaß (1832) Schopenhauer states: 
In my 17th year, without any academic formation, I was as 
moved by the xvretchedness of life as Buddha was in his 
youth, when he saw sickness, old age, pain, and death. 
The truth which the world spoke loudly and clearly, soon 
4 1 Nachlaß I, I, S.9; Remains, I, p. 9. 
4 2 Parerga II, IX, § 118, S.257; Parerga, II, § 118, p. 236. 
4 1 Vorstellung II, IV, Kap. 47, S.690-691; Representation, II, ch. 47, pp. 
589-590. 
4 4 Rüdiger Safranski, Schopenhauer und die luilden fahre der Philsophie 
(München: Carl Hauser Verlag, 1987), S.97; English translation: 
Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy, trans, by Ewald Osers 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 60. 
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prevailed over the Jewish dogmas which had been 
impressed in me, and my conclusion was that this world 
could not be the work of an infinitely-good Being, but 
rather that of a devil who had brought creatures into 
existence in order to delight at the sight of their 
affliction. 4 5 
A conversation recorded in Gespräche likewise alludes to the difficulties 
Schopenhauer had, even as a teenager, with the theistic claim that the world 
was made by an infinitely-good God. The passage reads as follows: 
As a young man 1 was always melancholic and on one 
occasion, I was perhaps eighteen years old then, 1 
reflected, even at this early age: This world is supposed to 
have been made by God? No, much rather by a devi l ! 4 6 
Two more fragments from Nachlaß are worth citing to buttress the 
aforementioned passages. Their biting sarcasm best highlights his rejection 
of faith in God as a reasonable alternative for himself at least. The first 
passage is taken from the "Quartant" section of his manuscript notes written 
at Dresden in 1824. The second passage is taken from the last volume of 
Nachlaß from the collection of fragments entitled "Senilia" which dates from 
1852 until his death in 1860. 
Prayer of a Skeptic: God,-if you exist,-rescue my soul from 
the grave,-if I have o n e . 4 7 
Conversation (Gespräch) from the year 33: A. Have you heard 
the latest? / B. No, what's happening? / A. The world is 
redeemed! / B. What are you saying! / A. Yes, the loving 
God has assumed human form and allowed himself to be 
put to death in Jerusalem. For this reason, the world is 
now redeemed and the Devil beaten (geprellt). / B. Why, 
that's truly charming. 4 8 
As the above indicates, a "front door" approach to the issue of the Sacred 
is clearly closed in Schopenhauer's thought. In the first place, his analysis of 
religion as the metaphysics of the people mentions nothing about religion as 
an encounter with the Holy. Secondly, he clearly rejects prmifs for God's 
existence. Thirdly, while he does say that God's existence rests on the "sure 
4 5 Nachlaß IV.1,S.96; Remains, IV, p. 119. 
4 6 Arthur Schopenhauers Gespräche, herausgegeben von Arthur Hübscher 
(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1971), S.131. 
4 7 Nachlaß 111, S.190; Manuscript Remains, III, p. 210. 
4 8 Nachlaß 1V.2, S.21; Manuscript Remains, IV, p. 380. 
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foundation" of Revelation, his demythologization of revealed scripture 
makes of God a mere human fabrication. Fourthly, belief in God cannot be 
reconciled with the existence of evil and moral responsibility. Hence, the 
tentative conclusion that there is no God in the philosophical system 
espoused and outlined in Die Weil als Wille und Vorstellung indeed seems 
viable. 4 9 
In short, as noted above, reality as comprised of will and representation 
cannot be considered the product of a divine creative a c t . 5 0 At first glance, 
Schopenhauer's system as totally immanent and self-contained leaves no 
room for the question of a Transcendent Being, as a scholar like Icilio 
Vecchiotti contends. 5 1 Alluding to the Schopenhauerian doctrine of "the 
total compenetration of mind and being in the Will," Cornelio Fabro likewise 
asserts that "the conscious and professed destination of this radical 
immanentism is a t h e i s m . " 5 2 This certainly is in keeping with what 
Schopenhauer wrote in an August 21,1852 letter to an overly eager follower 
of his (Frauenstadt), about transfiguring his doctrine of will so as to make it 
attractive to theologians: 
My dear friend, I must remind myself of all your many 
and great merits for the sake of the proclamation of my 
philosophy in order not to lose my patience and 
c o m p o s u r e . . . In vain, for example, have 1 written to you 
not to seek the thing-in-itself in cloud cuckoo land 
4 9 Cf. R. J. Hollingdale, Arthur Schopenhauer: Essays and Aphorisms 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 34; V. J. McGill, Schopenhauer 
Pessimist and Pagan (New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1971), pp. 
251 -252. 
5 0 Cf. Schmidt, Die Wahrheit im Gewände der Lüge (München: Serie Piper, 
1986), S.33. "Hat kein Intellekt die Natur hervorgebracht, sondern diese im 
Stufengang ihrer Objektivationen den Intellekt, ist das Wesen der Natur 
» e i n blinder Drang, ein völlig grundloser, unmotivirter T r i e b « , so folgt 
hieraus eine radicale Absage an den Schöpfungsgedanken des christlichen 
Theismus. Schopenhauer hat denn auch redlicherweise auf den 
atheistischen Grundzug seiner Philosophie hingewiesen." 
5 1 Cf. Icilio Vecchiotti, "Osservazioni preliminari sulla possibilita di una 
nozione di « s a c r o » in Schopenhauer," in Giorgio Penzo, ed. Schopenhauer e 
il sacro (Trento: lstituto Trentino di Cultura Pubblicazioni dell'lstituto di 
Scienze Religiose in Trento, 1987), p. 145: "Comminciamo col dire che e gia 
per definizione fuori causa e fuori tema il sacro delle religioni positive, il 
sacro delle religioni della trascendenza, ossia dell'ebraismo e dell'islamismo, 
esplicitamente e duramente a avversati dallo Schopenhauer. II filosofo ha 
detto chiaramente che la sua visione del mondo e immanente, non 
trascendente." 
5 2 Cornelio Fabro, God in Exile: Modern Atheism, trans. Arthur Gibbon 
(Westminster: Newman Press, 1968), p. 873. 
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(Wolkenkukuksheim) [that is, there where the God of the 
Jews resides], but in the things of this world-thus in the 
table on which you write, in the chair under your arse . . . 
My philosophy never concerns itself with cloud cuckoo 
land, but with this world; which is to say, that it is 
immanent, not transcendent. 5 3 
Along these lines, one will not find in the Schopenhauerian corpus a 
philosophy of religion that assimilates belief in the personal Creator God of 
Judeo-Christian tradition. Philosophy and religion cannot be wedded 
together. 5 4 Accordingly, one would be looking in vain for a philosophy of 
religion in Schopenhauer's thought that would entail adjusting of one's 
philosophical presuppositions to the premises of one's fai th. 5 5 Perhaps it is 
for this reason that Nietzsche states: "As a philosopher, Schopenhauer was 
the first admitted and inexorable atheist among us G e r m a n s . " 5 6 
Notwithstanding the above, Schopenhauer did reflect intensely about the 
nature of religion and Christianity in par t i cular . 5 7 Even though 
5 3 Cf. "An Julius Frauenstädt," Frankfurt a.M., den 21. August 1852, Brief 280, 
as found in Arthur Schopenhauer Gesammelte Briefe. Herausgeben von Arthur 
Hübscher (Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommannn Verlag, 1971), S.290-291. 
5 4 Cf. Heinrich Hasse, Schopenhauer (München: Verlag Ernst Reinhardt, 
1926), S.371. "Dem äußeren Anschein nach steht Schopenhauer einer 
Religionsphilosophie als selbstständiger Disziplin völlig ablehnend 
gegenüber. Hat er doch eine Lehre, welche diesen Namen führt, als 
» Z w i t t e r « und » K e n t a u r e n « nachdrücklich verworfen und dieser 
Verwerfung triftige Gründe beigesellt. Religionsphilosophie gilt ihm als 
unsachliche Verschmelzung wesensfremder Bestrebungen, deren Ergebnis 
nichts anderes als eine geistige Mißgeburt darstellen kann. Denn die Ziele 
der Philosophie fallen mit denen der Religion keineswegs zusammen." 
5 5 Cf. Schmidt, S.23. "Schopenhauer versteht unter Religionsphilosophie 
—sich kritisch schon von dem Begriff distanzierend -- jedes philosophische 
System, dessen Urheber darauf bedacht ist, seine Resultate in Einklang zu 
bringen mit der Glaubenslehre einer positiven Religion. Wenn im folgenden 
dargetan werden soll, daß religionsphilosophische Erwägungen einen 
wichtigen (obgleich kaum gebührend beachteten) Aspekt des Denkgebaudes 
von Schopenhauer bilden, so kann damit, folgen wir seinem 
Selbstverständnis, keine eilfertige Adaptation des Philosophierens an 
vorgegebene Dogmen gemeint sein. Jede Vermengung, gar Fusion, des 
unabhängigen, begründenden Denkens mit Autorität und übernatürlicher 
Offenbarung ist Schopenhauer verhaßt." 
5 6 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans, by Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Random House, 1974), Book V (No. 357), p. 307. 
5 7 Cf. Jörg Salaquarda, "Schopenhauer und die Religion," Schopenhauer-
Jahrbuch, 69 (1989), S.321; also cf. Bernard Bykhovsky, Schopenhauer ami the 
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Ground of Existence, trans, by Philip Moran (Amsterdam: B. R. Gruner 
Publishing Co., 1984), pp. 155-175. 
5 8 Hübscher, Denker gegen den Strom (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag 1988), S.13. 
»/Wrf., S.10-13. 
6 0 Patrick Bridgewater, Arthur Schopenhauer's English Schooling (London: 
Routledge,1988), p. 306. 
6 1 "Auf die Sistinische Madonna," Parerga 11, X. "Einige Verse," S.713; "To the 
Sistine Madonna," Parerga, II, "Some Verses," p. 655. The translation is that of 
E. F. J. Payne. The original German reads as follows: 
Sie trägt zur Welt ihn: und er schaut entsetzt 
In ihrer Gräu'l chaotische Verwirrung, 
In ihres Toberis wilde Raserei, 
In ihres Treibens nie geheilte Thorheit, 
In ihrer Quaalen nie gestillten Schmerz, -
Entsetzt: doch strahlet Ruh' und Zuversicht 
Und Siegesglanz sein Aug", verkündigend 
Schon der Erlösung ewige Gewißheit. 
Schopenhauer evidently rejected belief in a personal God once he directed 
his efforts to a serious study of philosophy, Hübscher contends that up until 
his twenty-fourth year "he stood under the confines of his Church." 5 8 It goes 
without saying that one ought not forget that his early educational formation 
(1799-1803) was in the private school of Johann Christian Runge, whose 
enlightened Pietism left a positive and life-long impression on 
S c h o p e n h a u e r . 5 9 In this respect, notwithstanding his metaphysical 
presuppositions which exclude the possibility for a "front door" approach to 
the question of God, Schopenhauer was not categorically opposed to religion 
as Bridgewater contends, but rather to the bigotry and excesses often 
associated with i t . 6 0 Certainly the following poem entitled "Auf die 
Sislinischc Madonna," written in Dresden during the year 1815, is but one 
indication (among many) of his fascination with religious themes: 
She bears him to the world, and startled 
He beholds the chaos of its abominations. 
The frenzy and fury of its turmoil, 
The never-cured folly of its striving, 
The never-stilled pain of its distress,— 
Startled: yet calm and confident hope and 
Triumphant glory radiate from his eye, already 
Heralding the abiding certainty of salvation. 6 1 
The essays "Über das metaphysische Bedürfniß des Menschen" in Chapter 17 
of the second volume of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, and "Über Religion" 
in Chapter 15 of the second volume of Parerga und Paralipomena, are further 
indications of the aforementioned fact—not to mention passages that can be 
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found in his other works. Accordingly, it is not incorrect to say with Hasse 
that much of Schopenhauer's philosophy is a "philosophical consideration 
whose object is religion." 6 2 Along these lines, it is even held by Horkheimer 
that Schopenhauer's system, emphasizing as it does the relationship between 
denial of the will-to-live and the ethical tendency of Christian asceticism, 
comprises "the last great philosophical attempt to preserve the kernel of 
Christianity." 6 3 
The claims made by these scholars indicate that the question of the 
Sacred in the philosophy of Schopenhauer needs to be approached more 
cautiously and in a less biased manner. Can it be argued that there is a "back 
door" to the question of the Sacred in Schopenhauer's thought? If the 
question of the Sacred or Holy has any relevance whatsoever in the 
philosophical system of Schopenhauer, another avenue obviously needs to 
be pursued. Perhaps a viable approach might be found in Schopenhauer's 
contention that insight into the noumenon is by no means absolute or 
exhaustive. On the one hand, he contends that the noumenal will is 
estranged in its phenomenal manifestation. But on the other hand, artistic 
genius and holiness of lifestyle suggest that the will has another dimension 
that from time to time manifests itself in the phenomenal sphere. It is 
perhaps here that the question of the Sacred has some relevance in an 
otherwise atheistic Weltanschauung, hence my rationale for asking whether 
this might constitute a "back door" since the "front door" is obviously barred 
shut. In the paragraphs that follow I would like to investigate this angle by 
concentrating on this seeming ambiguity characteristic to the will, and relate 
it to the "relative nothingness" that is the final result of ascetical holiness. An 
approach to the question of the Sacred in Schopenhauer's philosophy might 
indeed be possible in this respect. 
Knowledge of the noumenality of our being is not possible via normal 
representational cognition, linked as it is to space, time and causality. In this 
respect, Schopenhauer is in agreement with Kant in that he holds that 
representational cognition, the so-called knowledge "from without" can 
never take one beyond the phenomenon. 6 4 But while Schopenhauer admits 
with Kant that phenomenal knowing can take us only so far, he parts with 
him in contending that the hitherto unknowable noumenon is in fact the will. 
As is stated in Über den Willen in der Natur: 
. . , that which Kant opposed as thing-in-itself to mere 
phenomenon—called m o r e d e c i d e d l y by me 
representation—and that which he held to be absolutely 
unknowable, I say that this thing-in-itself, this substratum 
of all phenomena, and therefore of the whole of Nature, is 
6 2 Hasse, S.370. 
6 3 Max Horkheimer, "Religion und Philosophie," Scliopenhauer-Jahrbuch, 48 
(1967), S.5. 
6 4 Vorstellung II, Kap.18, III, S.229; Representation, II, ch. 18, p. 196. 
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nothing other than that which is directly known and very 
intimate to us, what we find within ourselves as the will.*** 
As the above indicates, Schopenhauer is making an important claim 
about the metaphysical capacity of the human being to know reality. At the 
very outset of the second book of the first volume of Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellung he informs the reader that his intention with regard to "the 
perceptual representation (anschauliche Vorstelling)" is to see whether 
"knowledge of its content, its more precise determinations, and the forms it 
presents to us" is indeed possible. 6 6 The clue to this question is linked to the 
corporeality of the human being: ". . . the meaning of the world . . . that 
stands before me simply as my representation . . . could never be found if the 
investigator himself were nothing more than the purely knowing subject (a 
winged cherub without a body)." 6 7 In a word, the human being as flesh and 
bone "finds himself rooted in this world as individual."6* This corporealized 
existence in effect means that human beings have a direct awareness of the 
inner states of their bodies, as opposed to a merely indirect awareness of 
anything else. To quote Schopenhauer: 
. . . the individual is the bearer of the knowing subject and 
the bearer of the world; which is to say, that the whole of 
nature outside him, therefore also all remaining 
individuals, exist only in his representation. He himself is 
always conscious of them only as his representation, hence 
merely indirectly, and as something dependent on his own 
inner being and existence. 6 9 
Now, an introspective glance at ourselves yields knowledge that differs 
from cognitional perception of objects in space. According to Schopenhauer, 
willing is the object of our self-consciousness. "When we look into our inner 
self (in unser Inneres blicken), we always find ourselves as willing (wollend).70 
Willing, the object of the inner sense, "has many degrees from the mildest 
wish to passion." 7 1 The essential element of willing is difficult to discern, 
but among all manifestations of willing are "all desiring, striving, wishing, 
demanding, longing, hoping, loving, rejoicing, exalting, and the like, no less 
than not willing, or resisting, abhorring, fleeing, fearing, being angry, hating, 
lamenting, suffering pains—in short, all emotional states and passions." 7 2 
6 5 Natur, V, S.202; Nature, p. 216. 
6 6 Vorstellung I, I, § 17, S.137; Representation, 1, § 17, p. 95. 
6 7 Ibid., S.l42; Ibid., p. 99. 
<* Ibid.; Ibid. 
6 9 Ibid., II, § 61, S.414; Ibid., § 61, p. 332. 
7»> Grunde, V, § 42, S.160; Reason, § 42, p. 211. 
7> Ibid.; Ibid. 
7 2 Freiheit, VI, I., S.51; Freedom, I., p. 11. 
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Willing, in a word, includes not only all emotional states (Affekte), but even 
movements of our inner nature (Bewegungen unsers Innern) subsumed under 
the wide concept of feeling (Gefühl).73 Feelings of pleasure and displeasure 
in their various degrees are likewise subsumed under the aforementioned 
concept. Pleasure and displeasure can be traced back to the affections of 
desiring or abhorring, thus "to the will itself becoming conscious of itself as 
satisfied or unsatisfied, restrained or unleashed." 7 4 Pleasant and unpleasant 
sensations enter directly into the self-consciousness as "something which is 
in conformity to the will or as something disagreeable to i t . " 7 5 
This inner knowledge to which each human being is privy, rooted as it 
is in the individual corporeality of the person, comprises the inner essence of 
the phenomenality of one's phenomenal corporeal being. What 
Schopenhauer does in effect is collapse any real distinction between an act of 
the will and movement of the body: "Every true act of [man's] will is also at 
once and inevitably a movement of his body; he cannot actually will the act 
without at the same time perceiving that it appears as a movement of the 
body." 7 6 The aforementioned identity is such that an action of the body is 
"nothing but the will objectified, i.e. which has become visible in 
perception." 7 7 
In light of the above, all impressions on the body are impressions on the 
will. An impression that is contrary to the will is called pain (Schmerz); one 
that is in accord with the will is called gratification (Wohlbehagen) or pleasure 
(Wollust).78 Pain and pleasure are not representations. Rather, they are 
referred to as "immediate affections of the will in its appearance" and as "a 
forced momentary willing or non-willing of the impression which the body 
undergoes (erleidet)."79 The aforementioned identity between an act of 
willing and an action of the body is also evident via an analysis of the will 
itself inasmuch as agitations of the will have ramifications on the states of 
the body. For "every vehement and excessive movement of the will, that is, 
every emotion, agitates the body and its inner workings directly and 
immediately, and disturbs the body and its vital funct ions ." 8 0 Some 
examples of this identity are listed in Über den Willen in der Natur: ". . . the 
acceleration of the heart in joy and fear, blushing in shame, turning pale in 
terror and in concealed anger, weeping in affliction, erection with 
voluptuous representations, difficult breathing and accelerated intestinal 
activity in great fear, saliva in the mouth at excessive sumptuousity, nausea 
7 3 Grunde, V, § 42, S.160; Reason, % 42, p. 211. 
7 4 Freiheit, VI, 1., S.51; Freedom, I., pp. 11-12. 
7 5 Ibid., S.51 -52; Ibid., p. 12. 
7 6 Vorstellung 1,1, § 17, S.143; Representation, 17, p. 101. 
7 7 Ibid.; Ibid.' 
7» Ibid., S.144; Ibid., p. 101. 
7 9 Ibid.; Ibid. 
8°iWrf.,S. 144-145; Ibid. 
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at the sight of disgusting things" are all indicative of a certain "sympathy" 
(Mitleidenschaft) between the will and body." 8 1 
It goes without saying that the knowledge one has of one's willing via 
the path of introspection presupposes rootedness in corporeality. The body 
is the very condition for the representation of the will known to the inner 
sense. But it is important to underscore that the will, as noumenon, is 
known only via particular acts in time to which states of the body's 
affections are linked. Schopenhauer states: 
I know my will not as a whole (im Ganzem), not as a unity, 
not perfectly according to its essence, but rather, I know it 
only in particular acts, thus in time, which is the form of 
the appearance (Erscheinung) of my body, as fit is] of each 
body. For this reason, the body is the condition of the 
knowledge of my will. Accordingly, without my body, I 
cannot in reality, represent (vorstellen) my will . 8 2 
What the above entails is that the will is the being-in-itself (Wesen an 
sich) of the corporeal phenomenon of each human being. In other words, the 
will is that which the body may be in addition to being an object of 
perception, or a representation. "My body and my will are one; or, that 
which as perceptual representation 1 call my body, I call my will insofar as I 
am conscious of it in an entirely different way comparable to no other; or my 
body is the objectivity of my will; or irrespective of the fact that my body is 
my representation, it is still only my will; and so o n . " 8 3 In light of the above 
discussion, for Schopenhauer the inner content of the phenomenality of 
one's own corporeal reality can be known. The noumenon, hitherto 
unknowable by the Kantian critique, is the will, the object of the inner sense. 
Though our willing is known to us "immediately," even this claim needs 
to be qualified. As was stated, willing is manifested a posteriori via 
successive states of time. This means, therefore, that the noumenon which is 
object of the inner sense can never appear in its pristine form. It is as if 
human corporeality and temporality, while paradoxically revealing what the 
noumenon is, at the same time irremediably conceal it. 
The inner knowledge in question is free from two of the forms 
belonging to the outer knowledge (space and causality which are involved in 
sense perception), but is shackled, as it were, by time as well as "that of being 
known (Erkannliverdens) and knowing in general (Erkennens überhaupt)." This 
entails that the will can never be known "as a whole" (im Ganzen) or "in and 
for itself (an und für s/c//).8 4 Accordingly, notwithstanding all that can 
8" Natur, V, S.227-228; Nature, pp. 246-247. 
8 2 Vorstellung I, I, § 18, S.145; Representation, I, § 18, pp. 101-102. 
8 3 Ibid., S. 146; Ibid., pp. 102-103. 
8 4 Vorstellung II, III, Kap. 18, p. 230; Representation, II, ch. 18, p. 197. 
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actually be attained by inner knowledge, it too is limited. Not even the inner 
eye can behold the noumenon in its quintessential and pure form. 
The above notwithstanding, in every act of willing there ensues an 
immediate transition of the extra-temporal thing-in-itself in the phenomenal 
sphere, such that acts of willing constitute the clearest expression of the 
thing-in-itself.8 5 Schopenhauer clarifies this insight in the following passage 
from his Philosoplüsche Vorlesungen: 
The will, as we find and perceive it in ourselves, is not 
really the thing-in-itself. For this will appears in our 
consciousness merely in individual and successive acts of 
will; these therefore already have time for a form, and are 
for that reason, already phenomenon (Erscheinung). This 
phenomenon, however, is the clearest revelation, the 
clearest becoming-visible (Sichtbanuerdung) of the thing-in-
itself, because it is altogether and immediately illumined 
by knowledge, object and subject here completely 
coincide, and here the essence itself which appears, has no 
other form except that of t ime. 8 6 
Yet what acts of willing initially reveal is the aspect of the noumenon 
that is scarred and diseased—what evidently most interested Schopenhauer. 
Succinctly stated: "at all grades of its phenomenon from the lowest to the 
highest, the will dispenses entirely without an ultimate aim and object. It 
always strives, because striving is its sole nature (Streben sein alleiniges Wesen 
ist), to which no attained goal can put an end." 8 7 Knowledge of the Platonic 
Ideas, which constitutes a so-called "immediate" or "adequate" objectification 
of the thing-in-itself, 8 8 can never usher one into the in-itselfness of things, 
but rather what comprises their so-called "most objective character." 8 9 
8 5 Ibid.; Ibid: Denn bei jedem Hervortreten eines Willensaktes aus der 
dunklen Tiefe unsers Innern in das erkennende Buswußtseyn geschieht ein 
unmittelbarer Uebergang des außer der Zeit liegenden Dinges an sich in die 
Erscheinung. Demnach ist zwar der Willensakt nur der nächste und 
deutlichste Erscheinung des Dinges an sich. 
8 6 Arthur Schopenhauer, Philosophische Vorlesungen aus dem handschritliehen 
Nachlaß, Band 2, Metaphysik der Natur, herausgegeben und eingeleitet von 
Volker Spierling (München: Pieper, 1987), S.101-102. Cf. Nachlaß III, S.3f>; 
Manuscript Remains, 111, p. 40. 
8 7 Vorstellung l, II, § 56, S.386; Representation, I, § 56, p. 308. 
8 8 Vorstellung I, I, § 32, S. 227; Representation, I, § 32, p. 174. 
8 9 Vorstellung II, IV, Kap.29, S.433; Represenatation, II, ch. 29, p. 364. "...die 
Ideen offenbaren noch nicht das Wesen an sich, sondern nur den objektiven 
Charakter der Dinge, also immer noch die Erscheinung: und selbst diesen 
Charakter würden wir nicht verstehn, wenn uns nicht das innere Wesen der 
Dinge, wenigstens undeutlich und im Gefühl, anderweitig bekannt wäre." 
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Early fragments from Nachlaß sometimes identify the thing-in-itself with 
the Idea. As a case in point is the following passage written in Dresden in 
1814: 
. . . now the Platonic Idea is Kant's thing-in-itself, in other 
words is free from time and space, and thus from 
plurality, change, beginning and end. It alone is the 
OVTOXH) or thing-in-itself.90 
But by 1815 Schopenhauer had identified the will, perceived in internal 
experience and felt in the body, with the thing-in-itself-a will devoid of 
rationality. "The world as thing-in-itself"is a great will which knows not what 
it wills; for it does not know but merely wills just because it is a will and 
nothing else." 9 1 With the publication of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung in 
1818 there is a complete bifurcation between the thing-in-itself as will and 
the Idea. "Idea and thing-in-itself are not absolutely one and the s a m e . " 9 2 
This implicitly suggests that what primarily interests Schopenhauer is the 
chaotic element in reality, and not what is ordered. "A philosophy, in which 
one does not hear in between the pages, the tears, the weeping, and 
gnashing of teeth and the terrible din of mutual universal murder, is no 
philosophy." 9 3 
Is there more to the thing-in-itself, to the will, than what the act of 
willing initially suggests? Schopenhauer contends that the thing-in-itself can 
have "determinations and modes of existence" that are beyond the exigence 
of philosophical grasp; and which remain as the essence of the thing-in-
itself, once the act of the complete denial of the will-to-live in ascetical praxis 
takes place. He clearly states in the second volume of Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellung: 
. . . the question may still be asked what that will, which 
manifests itself in the world and as the world, is ultimately 
and absolutely in itself; in other words, what is it apart 
from the fact that it manifests itself as will, or in general 
appears, that is to say, is knoxun in general. This question 
can never be answered, because . . . being-known itself 
already contradicts being-in-itself, and everything that is 
known is, as such, only phenomenon {Erscheinung). But 
the possibility of this question shows that the thing-in-
itself, which we know most immediately in the will, may 
have, entirely outside of all possible phenomenon, 
w Nachlaß I, S. 150; Manuscript Remains, I, p. 163. 
9> Ibid., S.169; Ibid., pp. 184-185. 
y 2 Vorstellung I, I, § 32, S.227; Representation 1, S32, p. 174. 
9 3 Gespräche, S. 337. 
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determinations, qualities, and modes of existence which 
for us are absolutely unknowable and incomprehensible, 
and which then remain as the essence of the thing-in-itself, 
when this . . . has freely abolished itself (aufgehoben hat) as 
will, therefore stepped out of the phenomenon altogether, 
and with regard to our knowledge, that is to say, as 
regards the world of phenomena, has passed over into 
empty nothingness. If the will were simply and absolutely 
the thing-in-itself, then this nothing would be absolute, 
instead of which it expressly appears to us there as a 
relative nothing. 9 4 
What this implies is that the thing-in-itself cannot be exhaustively and 
categorically identified with the scarred willing that introspection into one's 
corporeality reveals. For the "nothingness" which is the final goal of 
ascetical praxis is by no means to be understood in an absolute sense. Were 
it to be understood as such, then radical denial of the will-to-live in 
asceticism would result in "nothingness" in the proper sense of the term. But 
"nothingness" as the final end, or term, of Schopenhauer's demythologized 
asceticism appears to be a something that eludes the philosopher's conceptual 
tools to describe and fathom. The following passage from Philosophische 
Vorlesungen drives home this point: 
. . . the question can always still be asked what in the final 
analysis the will-in-itself may be? That is to say, what it may 
be, apart from the fact that it presents itself as Will, that is 
to say, apart from the fact that it appears in general, hence 
is known in general and is represented. This question is 
obviously never to be answered. For to-be-known (das 
Erkanntwerden) contradicts the thing-in-itself; and 
everything which is represented, is already phenomenon 
(Erscheinung). Solely from the possibility of this question, 
it arises that even the thing-initself... can have and may 
have, outside of all possible experience, determinations, 
qualities and modes of existence, which for us are 
absolutely ungraspable and unknowable. These qualities 
may now even constitute the existence of the thing-in-
itself, which . . . presents itself as a passage into 
nothingness, after it has freely abolished itself as will, by 
means of which the entire world of phenomena is also 
abolished . . . Were the will absolutely the thing-in-itself, 
then such a nothingness would be an absolute 
9 4 Vorstellung II, III, Kap.18, S.231; Representation, II, ch. 18, p. 198. 
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nothingness. But there we will find that it is only a 
relative nothingness. 9 5 
It is clear that Schopenhauer underscores that the will—as purely 
noumenal-cflM and may have qualities other than those experienced tin the 
phenomenal realm, via will-oriented cognition blind to the essential unity of 
reality. Paradoxically, it is aesthetic experience and the denial of the 
will-to-live, as respectively lived-out by the genius and saint, that clearly 
illustrate this. For creations of genius in the arts, as well as holiness in 
lifestyle, show that whatever the thing-in-itself might ultimately be, it has 
another potentiality that makes its appearance from time-to-time in the 
phenomenal sphere, normally scarred by estranged willing: 
. . . man is the most complete phenomenon of the will . . . 
Thus, in man the will can reach full self-consciousness, 
clear and exhaustive knowledge of its essence, as reflected 
in the whole world. As we saw...art results from the 
actual presence of this degree of knowledge. At the end of 
our whole consideration it will also follow that, through 
the same knowledge, an elimination and self-denial of the 
will in its most perfect phenomenon is possible, by the 
will's relating such knowledge to itself. Thus, the freedom 
which otherwise, as belonging to the thing-in-itself, can 
never show itself in the phenomenon, in such a case, 
appears in the phenomenon; and by abolishing the essence 
which lies at the root of the phenomenon, while the 
phenomenon itself continues to exist in time, it brings 
about a contradiction of the phenomenon with itself. 
Directly through this, it exhibits the phenomena 
(Phänomene) of holiness and self-denial . . . By this it is 
only generally indicated how man is distinguished from 
all the other phenomena of the will by the fact that 
freedom, i.e., independence of the principle of sufficient 
reason, which only belongs to the will as thing-in-itself 
and contradicts the phenomenon, nevertheless with him 
can possibly appear even in the phenomenon, where it 
then presents itself, however, as a contradiction of the 
phenomenon with itself. In this sense not only the will in 
itself, but even man can certainly be called free, and in that 
way be distinguished from all other beings.*••"» 
Philosophische Vorlesungen, II, S.I02-103. Cf. Nachlaß III, S.36-37; Manuscript 
Remains, III, p. 41. 
9 6 Vorstellung / , ! ! , § 55, S.362-363; Representation, I, S 55, pp. 287-288. 
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It is important to recall that the noumenon reveals itself inasmuch as it 
emerges from the depth of our inner self in acts of willing. But if the arts 
and the very phenomenon of self-denial and holiness are indicative that the 
will as "free" has appeared on the phenomenal plane, their reality is 
connected with that aspect of the noumenon that is extra-temporal--the 
relative nothingness which is also beyond linguistic grasp or explanation. 
The ramifications of this are important insofar as they serve to highlight the 
presence of mystery in Schopenhauer's thought, giving some indication as to 
why darkness and light are intertwined in his system. 
The question of the Sacred, accordingly, once again emerges inasmuch 
as by underscoring the relative nature of nothingness, there is a tacit 
admission that the pristine noumenon has an ulterior reality other than the 
one that appears in t ime. 9 7 Specifically with regard to the phenomenon of 
denial of the will-to-live, Schopenhauer states that "virtue and holiness do 
not proceed from reflexion, but from the depth of the will and its relation to 
knowledge." 9 8 As such, they are not explainable by a causality introduced 
by reason alone. Since pain, anguish and wickedness have their origin in the 
self-estrangement essential to the will in the phenomenon, 9 9 virtue and 
holiness are somehow rooted in the extra-temporal dimension of the will 
described as the "infinitely preferable peace of blessed nothingness." 1 0 0 The 
mind, however, is not satisfied with that explanation and wonders about 
what those qualities and modes of existence, characteristic to the noumenal 
will as independent of the temporal order, might in fact be; and why they 
are connected with, and in some way are, the source of virtue, for example. 
Besides, given the presuppositions of Schopenhauer's Weltanschauung, 
the ascetical praxis of the authentic saint in effect represents the only 
knowledge we can have of the noumenon as "non temporal." The Thomistic 
scholar Leo C. Elders has this in mind when he contends that holiness of 
lifestyle in-itself testifies to a transcendent rea lm. 1 0 1 Martin Hielscher 
echoes these sentiments by noting that the artist, but most especially the 
saint, incarnate the very goal or purpose of Schopenhauer's philosophy as 
something that is no longer immanent to the system, but beyond it. In this 
9 7 Cf. Guiseppe Invernizzi, "11 problema della cosa in se e la concezione della 
metafisica nella filosofia di Schopenhauer," Acme, 37 (1984), p. 1 0 3 : " . . . viene 
tacitamente ammesso che (la volonta) abbia una realtä ulteriore a quel I a che 
appare nel fenomeno, una realta che tuttavia si trova completamenle al di 
fuori della portata della nostra facolta conoscitiva." 
9 8 Vorstellung 1,1, § 12, S.95; Representation, I, § 12, p. 58. 
9 9 Cf. Nachlaß I, S. 146; Manuscript Remains, I, p. 158. 
1 0 0 Vorstellung II, IV, Kap.50, S.751; Representation, II, § 50, p. 640. 
1 0 1 Leo C. Elders, The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: E. 
J. Brill, 1990), p. 139. The passage in question states: 
Not unlike truth and beauty goodness and love, encountered in our 
contact with our fellowmen, also refer to a transcendent goodness 
and love. Saintliness in particular witnesses to God's existence. 
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respect, human self-transcendence as represented by the saint represents a 
"passing-over" (Überschreitung) into the realm of the noumenal which is 
beyond the capacity of human cognition to describe validly. 1 0 2 Because of 
this fact, Wolfgang Schirmacher contends that for Schopenhauer it is 
precisely "only through the phenomenon of the saint [that] we know about 
the Sacred." 1 0 3 Philosophically speaking the door is barred when it comes to 
describing meaningfully what that "non temporal" element might in fact be. 
Nevertheless, the saint does not hesitate to identify that noumenal, 
non-temporal reality for the philosopher, for whom such a state, while 
indeed existing, does not pertain to "knowledge" since it transcends the 
phenomenal realm as known by will-guided c o g n i t i o n . 1 0 4 So 
notwithstanding Schopenhauer's philosophical presuppositions which 
appear to seal shut the "front" door to God, the saint and ascetic by their 
lifestyles point to the very potentiality which the "relative" nothingness of 
the noumenal will has to effect the mysterious "neiu birth" (Wiedergeburt) and 
hasten the appearance of the "kingdom of grace" (das Reich der Gnade) as 
represented by Christ, who is the quintessential expression of the denial of 
the wilt-to live. In juxtaposition to this is the affirmation of the will, as 
characteristic of the "natural man" (der natürliche Mensch) whose will-oriented 
cognition is rooted in the temporality of the "kingdom of nature" (das Reich der 
Natur). Here Adam represents an archetypal Platonic Idea (that of affirming 
the will-to-live) which is extended to all human beings in time through the 
bond of generation. 1 0 5 
In light of the above, the task falls to Schopenhauer's readers to 
determine whether the explanation of the non-temporal dimension of the 
noumenon considered as relative nothingness is satisfactory enough not 
only to describe that reality which the ascetic deems so real, but to exhaust 
its significance. In like fashion, it is not so much the origin of evil (with 
which willing is linked) that is a problem, but rather the existence of its 
anti-thesis which is connected with genius and virtue. Schopenhauer clearly 
associates this denial with a "passing over into nothing" as the following 
passage from Parerga und Paralipomena indicates: 
. . . I observe that the denial of the will-to-live does not in 
anyway assert the annihilation of a substance, but the 
1 0 2 Martin Hielscher, "Der Heiige und die Überschreitung," in Schopenhauers 
Aktualität, hrsg. von Wolfgang Schirmacher (Wien: Passagen Verlag, 1988), 
S.2Ü7. 
KO Wolfgang Schirmacher, "Der Heilige als Lebensform Überlegungen zu 
Schopenhauers ungeschriebener Lehre," as found in Schopenhauers Aktualität, 
S. 189. 
«M Vorstellung I, II, § 71, S.506; Representation, I, § 71, p. 410. 
1 0 5 Ibid., % 70, S.499-501; Ibid., § 70, pp. 404-406; Vorstellung II, IV, Kap.48, 
S.736; Representation, II, ch. 48, p. 628. Cf. also Nachlaß I, S.85-86 and S.468; 
Manuscript Remains, I, pp. 93-94 and pp. 518-519. 
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mere act of not-willing. That which hitherto willed no 
longer 7«7fe. As we know the being, the essence, the will as 
thing-in-itself merely in and through the act of willing, we 
are incapable of saying or grasping what it still is or does 
after it has given up this act. Therefore, for us who are the 
phenomenon of willing, the denial is a passing over into 
nothing {ein Uebcrgang in's Nicbts).i0b 
As the above illustrates, Schopenhauer is struggling for adequate 
terminology to describe what non-willing entails given his metaphysical 
presuppositions. Moreover, with regard to virtue, holiness, and genius the 
so-called "temporal" or "empirical" human being does not seem to be "his 
own work" in the strict sense of the term, if it is the case that these 
phenomena have as their source the non-temporal noumenon which is 
antecedent even to the will's adequate objectification in the Ideas. 
Accordingly, the question of the Sacred remains an issue and serves as a 
springboard for further reflection in light of the "unanswerables" in 
Schopenhauer's system of thought. 
I * Parerga II, IX, Kap.14, § 161, S.339;" Parerga, II, ch. 14,161, p. 31. 
